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This paper evaluates the possible effects of advertising on condi-
tions of entry in a market with one incumbent and one potential en-
trant. Through a game-theoretic framework, it is shown that the 
use of pre-entry advertising expenditures (which are supposed to 
exhibit diminishing returns) may discourage entry even when firms 
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In the last decades a growing attention has been addressed to 
models of entry deterrence. The contributions by Bain (1956), Sylos 
Labini (1962) and Modigliani (1958) have become milestones in the 
literature of industrial economics, even if they have been criticised 
on the ground of the credibility of the main hypotheses. 
Recent debates in oligopoly theory have therefore tried to 
draw situations where strategic actions for entry deterrence pur-
poses are also rational for all the firms (actual and potential). Since 
Schelling (1960), the concept of “binding commitment”
1 has been 
widely used in the modern theory of strategic entry barriers, where 
it consists mainly in an irreversible investment from the incumbent 
firm. Spence (1977) suggests that an established firm can commit 
itself by overinvesting in production capacity before entry occurs, 
while Dixit (1980) develops Spence’s model and shows that ra-
tionality and profit-seeking behaviour determine the convenience 
to use all of the excess capacity both with and without entry
2. 
                                                            
1 See  TIROLE (1988), p. 316. 
2 According  to  BULOW et al. (1985), this conclusion depends strongly on the 
slope of firms’ reaction curves: if they are downward sloping Dixit’s result is true, 
but when they are upward sloping, Spence’s intuition may reappear. 8 
In this paper we give an evaluation of the choice of advertising 
as an entry deterrence instrument. Actually, the existence of ho-
mogeneous goods in a market is surely one of the strongest 
simplifications in economic theory, since product differentiation 
allows firms to avoid the competition and search for market niches, 
at the same time persuading consumers that different products are 
different goods. Advertising is a way to differentiate products, 
providing information on their presence, price or quality. 
According to the Dorfman-Steiner
3 condition, a profit-
maximising firm will use advertising up to the point at which its 
marginal value product is equal to the price elasticity of demand. 
This result is usually employed to show that advertising is normally 
associated with non-competitive markets. The positive relationship 
between advertising-sales ratio and price-cost margin, underlying 
the Dorfman-Steiner condition, has been confirmed by empirical 
studies
4. Furthermore, Cubbin and Domberger (1988) show that in 
a static market the dominant firms are more likely to use advertis-
ing in order to respond to entry. This implies that advertising is 
considered one of the instruments to be employed by the incum-
bent firms if they wish to assume a hostile behaviour and hence to 
deter entry. 
The impact that advertising is supposed to have on market 
structure, and particularly on conditions of entry is one of the most 
controversial aspects in economic literature. It has been impossi-
ble to prove either the informative (pro-competitive) or the persua-
sive (anti-competitive) role of advertising in a market. Many stud-
ies, both theoretical and empirical, have been pursued in support 
of the two views, but the results have not always been fully con-
vincing
5. Probably it is hard to choose unequivocally between 
these extreme positions, since the effects of advertising on market 
structure are related to product attributes, the nature of advertising 
                                                            
3  Actually, while the “advertising as persuasion” view suggests a positive rela-
tionship between the level of advertising and market concentration, either a posi-
tive or negative relationship would be consistent with the “advertising as informa-
tion” view. See DORFMAN and STEINER (1954). See also NERLOVE and ARROW 
(1962), SCHMALENSEE (1972) and CABLE (1972). 
4  For example, COMANOR and WILSON (1974) and CABLE (1972). 
5 F ERGUSON and FERGUSON (1994), pp. 75-76. 9 
and consumer information
6. 
In any case, it is undeniable that advertising activity exerts 
some influence on the behaviour of incumbents or potential firms. 
When a firm decides to advertise, its main aim is to change de-
mand conditions, especially to reduce price competition through 
product differentiation. The effects of this single action spread over 
the whole market: the consumers who buy the product of the ad-
vertiser might not be the purchaser of other similar goods for a cer-
tain time, with negative implications on the demand of the other 
firms. As a consequence, potential entrants could face an entry 
barrier, whose height is linked to aspects such as brand loyalty 
and penetration costs. 
It is not clear whether advertising can play a decisive role in 
entry deterrence, also if the economic literature provides several 
models where advertising gives rise to entry barriers. Since Bain 
(1956), many scholars argue that product differentiation is one of 
the most important sources of barriers to entry, and that this ad-
vantage is linked mainly to the long-term effects of advertising on 
consumers’ behaviour (goodwill). However, it has been also ar-
gued that, in order that advertising creates an entry barrier, there 
must be asymmetries between existing and entrant firms. 
Schmalensee (1974) uses a general distributed lag model to 
consider a dynamic demand function; his results demonstrate that 
if the incumbent firms and the potential entrants can produce 
equally effective advertising and equally desirable products, it is 
hard to see advantages for established firms which can be used to 
hinder entry
7. The need of the presence of some absolute advan-
tage for existing firms is contradicted by Cubbin (1981), who 
shows that advertising can contribute to the creation of entry barri-
ers even when there is no asymmetry in firms’ cost or demand 
functions. This result depends on the nature of the previous func-
tions as well as the requirement that the entrant expects the post-
entry advertising of the incumbent firm will be positive, and is con-
                                                            
6 See  SCHMALENSEE (1986), p. 386. It has been also stressed that from a 
theoretical point of view the correlation between advertising and profitability does 
not necessarily reflect entry difficulties. On this point, see SCHMALENSEE (1976) 
and NEEDHAM (1976). An opposite view is by VERNON and NOURSE (1973). 
7 See  SCHMALENSEE (1974), p. 584. See also NEEDHAM (1976) and COMANOR 
and WILSON (1979), p. 454-457. 10 
nected to the fact that the entrant faces a more limited demand set 
than the established firm
8. 
Since advertising has long-term effects, in analogy with in-
vestment in production capacity one might think that an incumbent 
monopolist would sometimes find optimal to overinvest in promo-
tional expenditures in order to deter entry. Schmalensee (1983) 
suggests that investment in advertising may differ strongly from the 
investment in capacity, and shows that the optimal response to the 
entrant implies underinvestment in advertising with respect to the 
situation where there is no threat of entry
9. Using the taxonomy in-
troduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), the established firm 
should have a “lean and hungry look”, underinvesting in order to 
respond aggressively to potential competitors, while overinvest-
ment in advertising would make it a pacifistic “fat cat” with little in-
centive to deter entry. 
There have been also many empirical studies trying to evalu-
ate the impact of high advertising intensity on barriers to entry. 
Also in this case we have different results, so that the dispute be-
tween those who believe that advertising deters entry and those 
who do not is far from being solved. The former group refers to re-
gression results exhibiting strong positive relationships between 
advertising and profits, while the latter group mainly maintains that 
these studies suffer from simultaneous equation bias or specifica-
tion errors or both
10. 
Using a game-theoretic approach, this paper aims at offering a 
contribution to this debate. Our results show that, under particular 
conditions of cost and demand and even without uncertainty, ad-
                                                            
8 S PENCE (1980) maintains that an incumbent can deter entry through a bind-
ing commitment to heavy post-entry advertising if there exist scale economies in 
advertising. 
9  This happens because an incumbent’s investment in advertising increases 
the number of loyal consumers, what contrasts with an expansion of production or 
a reduction of price in case of entry since this behaviour would involve giving up 
secure profits coming from the sales to the captive clients. 
10 C UBBIN (1981), p. 289. The potential pro-competitive effects of advertising 
emerge from the empirical studies by BENHAM (1972) and BOYER (1974), KESSIDES 
(1991) and GRABOWSKI  and VERNON (1992). Instead, RIZZO and ZECKHAUSER 
(1990) and ROSENBAUM and LAMORT (1992) provide empirical results showing that 
advertising could be a factor inhibiting entry. 11 
vertising can be used for entry deterrence purposes. The presence 
of asymmetry is a mere consequence of the fact that the incum-
bent firm is already in the market and can choose to commit re-
sources in advertising activity, thus reinforcing its first-mover ad-
vantage. Furthermore, it will not be necessary to suppose that the 
entrant expects the incumbent will surely invest in advertising. In 
section 2 we set out our model of a three-stage entry game. Sec-
tion 3 identifies the solutions of the game, which are discussed in 





2.  The hypotheses and the model 
 
 
The main premise of this analysis is that promotional expendi-
tures shift out the demand curve for the firm that affords them. This 
can be thought of as an increase in consumers’ “willingness to 
pay”, or as an increase in quantity demanded at a given price. In 
other words, advertising conveys information about the good, cre-
ates loyalty to the product and so allows the firm to set a higher 
price
11, at the same time leading to a reduction of demand for a 
similar good produced by another firm. 
The cost of promotional advertisements is assumed to be 
quadratic to permit diminishing returns to advertising expenditures: 
as they increase, their effectiveness is lower and lower, because it 
is more and more difficult to reach consumers who didn’t receive 
messages before
12. 
Since the hypothesis to be tested in this paper is that advertis-
ing can be used as a strategic weapon to deter entry, it is assumed 
that there is an established firm (called 1) in the market (a monop-
oly initially), and a potential entrant (called 2). The incumbent can 
                                                            
11  Like many papers about the relationship between advertising and entry bar-
riers, by choice here we don’t focus our attention on the effects of firms’ promo-
tional expenditures on consumer sovereignty and welfare. 
12  The same hypothesis characterises the analysis by SCHMALENSEE (1974), p. 
581. On the argument see also SIMON (1970) and LAMBIN (1976). 12 
invest in advertising either to maximise its own profit or to discour-
age the entry of the rival firm (driving its profits to zero), but it can 
also decide to accommodate entry, therefore choosing a level of 
advertising expenditure compatible with Cournot duopoly. In turn, 
the latter can decide whether to enter or not, and whether to adver-
tise or not. The game is sequential: the monopolist decides first, 
then the entrant observes the action of the incumbent and makes 
its own choice. In the final stage, if firm 2 decides to enter, a       
Cournot-Nash equilibrium with quantity-setting will emerge; other-
wise, the established firm will maintain its monopolistic position. 
The game can therefore be solved by backward induction, assum-
ing a common discount factor equal to one. Post-entry behaviour is 
noncooperative. The game tree is shown in Figure 1. 
Let us consider the following quadratic utility function
13: 
 





a, b > 0,     Q = qi + qj,     i, j = 1, 2,     j ≠ i 
 
where y is a composite good, Q is the total quantity of the good 
whose market we are studying, Ai and Aj are the advertising ex-
penditures, all affecting the utility as described above. 
When there is no advertising in the market (Ai = Aj = 0), the 
good is homogeneous and the inverse market demand function is 
 
p = a – bQ          Q = qi + qj,          i, j = 1, 2,          j ≠ i. 
 
If one or both firms advertise, two different demand curves 
must be considered. Now Ai (i = 1, 2) represents the increase in 
the willingness to pay of consumers induced by advertising; it can 
also be regarded as the rise of price that firms can apply to every 
unit of good sold. This is possible thank to the brand loyalty en-
sured by ad campaigns (note also that in this model they don’t af-
fect the degree of product differentiation between goods). 
Now the inverse demand functions can be written as: 
 
                                                            
13  For similar functions, see SHUBIK and LEVITAN (1980) and SINGH and VIVES 
(1987). 13 
pi = a + Ai – Aj – bqi – bqj          i, j = 1, 2,     j ≠ i. 
 
We can notice that here advertising affects the utility function 
in a “persuasive” way: if Ai = Aj, the perceived utility of the goods is 
the same, and the consumer is indifferent between them; if Ai > Aj, 
the utility increases as the consumption of good i grows and/or the 
consumption of good j goes down. In terms of market demand, this 
means that advertising by firm i has the effect of increasing the 
price of good i for any given level of demand
14. 
For simplicity the cost of production is assumed equal to zero, 






c =                i = 1, 2. 
 
Before turning to the detection of the optimal behaviour of the 




The optimal amount of advertising is such that 0 ≤ Ai ≤ a, i = 1, 2. 
 
PROOF. 
The value of the lower bound of Ai does not require any particular 
discussion. To calculate the upper bound, we have to consider that 
the maximum amount of advertising from one firm must induce the 
exit of the rival, which happens when the latter is willing to offer its 
own good at zero price but is unable to find customers. So firm i 
has to find a qi
M such that qj = 0 in the limit case pj = 0. Substituting 
in the inverse demand function of firm j, we get qi
M = a/b. To reach 
the new a/b consumers, the amount of advertising Ai
M required for 
this purpose is such that at old price pi the size of its own market 
must be equal to the old one plus a/b units (just the quantity stolen 
to the rival). Therefore we must impose the equality between               
pi’ = a – bqi and pi’’ = a + Ai – b(qi + a/b), obtaining Ai = a.     QED 
                                                            
14  Note also that we are considering the case of perfect “business-stealing”, 
since the ads of one firm attracts only consumers who would otherwise buy from 
the other firm. See MOTTA (1997), p. 30. 14 
The derivation of quantities and profits for firm 1 (the incum-
bent) and firm 2 (the entrant) is found in the Appendix. These val-






3.  The market equilibrium solutions 
 
 
To find out the solutions of this game, we have to evaluate the 
profit of each of the two firms. Using backward induction, the be-
haviour of the entrant must be considered first. It will enter the 




If the incumbent chooses not to advertise, the rival will enter and 
invest in advertising. 
 
PROOF. 
According to the game tree in Figure 1, the options for the entrant 
are: no entry (1), enter but not advertise (2), enter and advertise 






2 = π  and 







π . The latter is positive for bv > 2. In the same in-
terval, it is π2(3) > π2(2) for any value of bv. When bv < 2, the sec-
ond derivative of π2(2) with respect to A2 is positive, so the entrant 
chooses A2 = A2
M = a, what would also cause the exit of the in-
cumbent since q1




If the incumbent chooses the amount of A1 which maximises π1 in 
the monopolistic case, the rival will enter and invest in advertising 15 
when bv < 1/2 or bv > 2; otherwise, it will not enter. 
 
PROOF. 
The monopolistic choice of A1 for the incumbent (corresponding to 







A . Again, the options available to the entrant 
would be: no entry (4), enter but not advertise (5), enter and adver-
tise (6). From the Appendix, the corresponding profits are:             
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π  and  2
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π . Both 
cases 5 and 6 exhibit positive values for q2 and/or π2 when bv < 1/2 





If the incumbent decides to set an A1 that accommodates the entry 
of firm 2, the rival will enter and invest in advertising when bv < 2/9 
or bv > 2; otherwise, it will not enter. 
 
PROOF. 







) 8 ( ) 8 (
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= =π π , 
which are clearly positive for bv > 2. When bv < 2, the second de-
rivative of πi(8) with respect to Ai is positive (i = 1, 2); therefore 
both      firms set Ai = Ai
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= π , they are negative when bv < 2/9. 




For bv < 1/2, the incumbent will set A1 = A1
M = a, thus making un-
profitable the entry of the rival. 
 
PROOF. 
According to Proposition 2, in this interval firm 1 must invest in ad-16 
vertising to avoid to be put away by firm 2. Furthermore, Proposi-
tion 3 tells us that the rival will enter if the incumbent sets the value 
A1 without taking into account the other firm’s behaviour. But firm 1 
will choose A1 = A1
M = a when bv < 1/2, since in this interval the 
second derivative of π1(4) is positive. This choice allows the in-
cumbent to hold its monopolistic position, because π1
M(4) > 0 and 
π1
M(5) > 0, while π2(5) < 0. In case 6 (when firm 2 can invest in ad-
vertising), the optimal choice of the entrant would be A2 = A2
M = a. 
From  Proposition  4  we  know  that  this  is  just  case  8  with                 
Ai = Ai




) 9 2 (
) 8 (
2 −
= π , and also that these profits 
are positive for bv < 2/9. The earlier discussion allows us to evalu-
ate the behaviour of the established firm in two intervals: a) when       
bv < 2/9, the incumbent will compare π1
M(4), π1(7) and π1
M(8); b) 
when 2/9 < bv < 1/2, he will only compare π1
M(4) and π1(7), given 
that π1
M(8) < 0. Since it is always π1
M(4) > π1(7) > π1
M(8), firm 1 will 
set A1 = A1




For 2 < bv < 3 +  13 , the incumbent will deter the entry of the ri-
val setting A1 = a/3. 
 
PROOF. 
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 have shown that for bv > 2 the optimal 
choice of firm 2 is to enter and advertise, no matter what firm 1 de-
cides. Accordingly (and also considering the possibility of deterring 
entry), the latter has to select one among points 3, 6, 7, 8 (see Figure 
1). It is easy to verify that π1(7) > π1(3) for 2 < bv < 5 +  5  (note that 








and π1(7) > π1(8) for bv < 3 +  13 . Therefore, the incumbent will in-
vest in advertising to deter entry as long as 2 < bv < 3 +  13 , gaining 








In this interval, it is always π1(8) > π1(3) and π1(8) > π1(6), and a 
Cournot duopoly with advertising will emerge.     QED 
 
 




0 < < bv   → The incumbent chooses A1
M = a, the rival 





< < bv   → The incumbent chooses A1 s o  a s  t o  m a x i -
mise its monopolistic profit, the rival does 
not enter. 
 
13 3 2 + < < bv   → The incumbent chooses A1 so as to deter 
the entry, the rival does not enter. 
 
13 3 + > bv   → The  incumbent  chooses  A1 to accommodate 
the entry, the rival enters and advertises. 
 
Therefore, entry is blockaded for bv < 2, deterred for 








We can verify that for  13 3 2 + < < bv  there is overinvest-18 
ment  in  advertising  in  order  to  prevent  entry,  because  it  is         
A1(7) > A1(8) > A1(6); actually, if bv > 2 firm 2 surely enters and 
advertises, so that now case 7 must be compared with cases 6 
and 8. If  13 3 + > bv , since there is no possibility to deter the ri-
val’s entry and its investment in advertising, the existing firm has to 
afford promotional expenses in any case (we have already seen 
that for these values of bv it is π1(8) > π1(3)), even if the best 
choice for both of them would be to refrain from advertising           
(πi(8) < πi(2), i = 1, 2): once more there is overinvestment in adver-
tising from firm 1, but now it has to accommodate entry. 
Here the simple taxonomy of investment strategies provided 
by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) can not be applied because in this 
model we admit strategic investments for both the incumbent and 
the entrant. Nevertheless, we can try to extend the results of the 
standard Fudenberg-Tirole asymmetric analysis to our symmetric 
framework and thus evaluate the emerging equilibria. 
The profit of the two firms can be written as: 
 
πi = πi(Ai, Aj, qi(Ai, Aj), qj(Ai, Aj))          i, j = 1, 2,     j ≠ i. 
 
Differentiating with respect to Ai and Aj, and considering that 
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The first bracket of dπi contains the effect of the advertising of 
firm i on its own profit; the second one shows the impact of the ad-
vertising of the rival on the same profit. Both are formed by two 







































Therefore, we can state that the second part is surely nega-
tive: according to Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), firm j will overin-19 
vest in advertising because this investment makes it tough. The 
first part of dπi has a negative direct effect and a positive strategic 
effect, but the global sign is positive, what means that firm i will 
overinvest for strategic purposes. Hence, the equilibrium is one 
where both firms overinvest in advertising: the entrant aims to 
avoid an aggressive post-entry play by the incumbent firm, who will 
choose the same conduct to look tough in turn. In the “animal” 
terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole, there are two “top dogs” fac-
ing each other. 
This result recalls the equilibrium occurring in the production 
capacity models by Spence and Dixit
15, but is different from the 
Schmalensee’s (1983) model. In the latter the optimal strategy for 
entry deterrence was underinvestment in advertising because 
price discrimination was ruled out and a single price prevailed in 
the market
16, while in our model we admit two different demand 
curves for the two firms. 
As we have seen before, when  13 3 + > bv  both firms earn 
lower profits than they would under Cournot duopoly (πi(8) < πi(2),   
i = 1, 2). Hence, strategic implications force them to afford promo-
tional expenditures, and the resulting Nash equilibrium is not the 
Pareto-efficient solution: strategic interaction between rational 
players who behave noncooperatively doesn’t yield the optimal 
outcome for each of them. In any case, the choice of the optimum 
level of advertising from the two firms in this interval is in line with 
the solution suggested by the Dorfman-Steiner condition
17. 
It should be noted that entry is more likely to occur as b and/or 
v increase. It is clear that when v is higher advertising is more 
                                                            
15  See also TIROLE (1988), p. 327. 
16 See  SCHMALENSEE (1983), p. 652, and SCHMALENSEE (1986), p. 390-391. 
17 Following  WATERSON (1984, p. 131), it can be demonstrated that in a du-
opoly for firm 1 the Dorfman-Steiner condition can be written as follows: 
pAA1 / p1q1 = [(p1 - MC1) / p1]·[ε (q1A1) + ε (q1A2)·ε (A2A1)], 
where ε (q1A1) represents the direct effect of own advertising on own demand,     
ε (q1A2) the effect of rival’s advertising on own demand, and ε (A2A1) the effect of 
own advertising on rival’s advertising behaviour. With Cournot conjectures about 
advertising, it is ε (A2A1) = 0; rearranging the previous expression according to the 
values used in the model, we obtain that A1 = 2p1 / bv. Since in a Cournot du-
opoly (like in point 8) it is p* = a/3, substituting we get A1* = 2a / 3bv. 20 
costly, lowers profits and thus discourages its use for entry deter-
rence purposes. When b increases, the possibility of entry is 
higher because the demand curve of each firm is steeper and 
steeper, so a given amount A of advertising investment from the 
incumbent (which moves its own curve toward right and the other 
firm’s curve toward left) has less and less effect on the quantity 
sold by the rival: when b tends to an infinite number, the demand 
curves are vertical and any promotional expenditure will have no 
effect on the sales of the other firm (entry deterrence is then im-
possible). Figure 2 points out this occurrence in the hypothesis of a 
linear demand curve: when b is low (flatter curve), the advertising 
expenditure  A from the incumbent shifts the potential entrant’s 
curve backwards, and at a given level of price p* the reduction of 
demand for the entrant (∆q) is bigger than it would when b is high 
(steeper curve). 
To sum up, the theoretical outcome of this paper confirms the 
effectiveness of advertising as a barrier to entry, even though its 
viability is restricted within a particular range of values of b and v. 
In this model, advertising has the same effect on the demand of 
incumbent and entrant. Nevertheless, the incumbent is already in 
the market, and has the possibility to choose between allowing en-
try and competing with the rival, according to the profit expected in 
each of post-entry regimes. The advantage of the established firm 
consists in being the first to invest in advertising, thus creating a 
captive market for its products and at the same time reducing the 
size of potential clientele for the entrant. In other words, the prior 
existence gives a pre-entry asymmetry advantage
18, even if the 









The development of the game theory literature has allowed a 
                                                            
18 See  SALOP (1979), p. 335. 21 
deeper analysis of the interrelations between firms in entry deter-
rence modelling. In particular, it helped to improve the specification 
of the games between the incumbents and the entrants
19, as well 
as the strategic instruments to be used for entry deterrence pur-
poses (mainly R&D, capacity, product differentiation). 
Many studies have also tried to find out the conditions under 
which advertising can be chosen to impede entry. They showed 
that both underinvestment and overinvestment in promotional ex-
penditures by the incumbent can turn out to be optimal strategies, 
depending on the specification of the relationship between the cost 
and demand functions of the players. 
Our model has shown that in a context of decreasing returns 
to advertising there exist certain conditions of cost and demand 
under which a rational behaviour of established and potential firms 
may generate entry barriers. Specifically, according to this model, 
the pressure of potential entry and the effect that advertising is 
supposed to have on demand imply that the incumbent firm will 
always overinvest in promotional activities, while entry may be 
possible depending on the slope of demand function and the cost 
of advertising. 
 
                                                            
19  Among the others, it is worth to recall SELTEN’s (1975) concept of perfect 
equilibrium, and the papers by KREPS and WILSON (1982) and MILGROM  and     
ROBERTS (1982), that illustrate the viability of entry deterrence in contexts of 
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Three-stage game tree: computation of the payoffs for each firm 
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2) Firm 1 doesn’t advertise, firm 2 enters but doesn’t advertise 
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3) Firm 1 doesn’t advertise, firm 2 enters and advertises 
 
The profit functions are: 
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It follows that: 
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5) Firm 1 advertises to maximise its profit, firm 2 enters but doesn’t 
advertise 
 
Here (and in the following point) the key assumption is that the 
incumbent firm doesn’t know what kind of behaviour the potential 
entrant will adopt about entry and advertising expenditures (the 
game is sequential). For this reason it seems plausible that firm 1 
will invest in advertising in order to maximise its own profit, with no 
regard to the consequences of this irrecoverable expenditure on 
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The solutions are: 
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Solving, we get: 
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7) Firm 1 advertises to lower π2 up to zero 
 
Here we have the following profit functions: 
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Imposing that the optimal value of A1 must make the entry of 30 
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8) Firm 1 advertises to accommodate entry and share the market 
with the rival; firm 2 enters and advertises 
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